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Analysing Crisis Parliamentary Discourse in Greece: Who Should We Blame? 
 
Abstract 
This article analyses differences in the variety of political rhetoric on structuring and 
legitimizing argumentation and strategies during periods of economic and political crisis. 
Driven by developments in theory about blame-shifting and ‘exogenisation’ of the causes of 
crisis as well as employing advanced techniques of analysis, it focuses on the parliamentary 
bailout debates in Greece during the ‘crisis’ period (2009-2015). By means of Computer 
Assisted Content Analysis (CATA) it analyses the content of arguments which relate to blame 
shift.  It is shown that blame-shifting is much more complex that just blaming the external 
enemy and often takes the form of ‘historical blame shifting’, turning the blame to previous 
governments. It is revealed that party leaders often use a much more polemic discourse than 
Members of Parliament (MPs). Finally, it is shown that blame-shifting diminishes once a party 
comes to power following Mair’s (2009) representative versus responsible government 
argument. 
 
Introduction 
Political discourse in the last decade has increasingly been characterised by exaggerated 
claims, blame shift, a lack of attention and in some cases the promotion of fake news in order 
to achieve political aims (Bennett, 2016, Allcott and Gentzkow, 2017).  The media talk about 
the rise of populism and academics are debating the exact meaning, content and causes of 
populism (Mudde, 2007; Pappas, 2016).  This controversial shift in political discourse can be 
observed across the political spectrum in what sometimes appears to be an unconscious race 
to the bottom. Party leaders, parliamentarians and party members are all inclined to use such 
discourse.   
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In this article, we aim to measure blame-shifting and ‘exogenisation’ of the causes of the 
political and economic crisis (2009-2015) in Greece in order to evaluate how widespread this 
trend is in a crisis situation.  We draw on the literature on blame shift during crisis and apply 
it to the impact of the Eurozone crisis upon parliamentary discourse in Greece along with the 
argument that blame shift increases during crises (Boin, Hart and McConnell, 2009). Greece is 
chosen since it was the country most dramatically hit by the financial crisis both economically 
and politically. Three Economic Adjustment Programmes (or Memoranda, in everyday 
language) have been negotiated and implemented in order to rescue the country from 
bankruptcy1.  The austerity stemming out of these Programmes has economically, politically 
and socially shaken the country and the political status quo. 
By means of Computer Assisted Content Analysis (CATA) the article analyses the content of 
arguments which relate to blame shift presented in parliamentary debates. From the analysis 
of these parliamentary debates we suggest that within the crisis period, from the first bailout 
in 2010 to the third in 2015, an increase in both blame shift and ‘exogenisation’ of the causes 
of crisis can be observed across the political spectrum.  This ‘exogenisation’ is complex since 
it involves a domestic mediator between the ‘external enemy’ and the crisis which is portrayed 
as the ‘old establishment’.  This is what we call ‘historical blame-shifting’. This type of 
‘exogenisation’ has direct implications for the political system, for accountability mechanisms 
and thus for the implementation of policy reforms. Interestingly, when political parties 
become members of governing coalitions this type of blame shift seems to decline in 
comparison to their status as part of the parliamentary opposition.  Evasion from the problem 
to other issues or technicalities is a common strategy.  Finally, it is revealed that party leaders 
use a much more polemic discourse than MPs. 
The article is organised into four sections.  The first section critically discusses the literature 
on blame shift during crisis and elaborates on the research’s argument. The second section 
                                                          
1The terms Economic Adjustment Programme, Memorandum and bailout agreement are used 
interchangeably throughout the article. 
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provides the background to the Greek case study. The third section introduces the research 
questions and methodology used in the article. The final section analyses the findings of the 
research and provides some insights about the relationship between crisis and the 
‘exogenisation’ of blame shift.   
 
Crisis, ‘exogenisation’ of blame and political discourse  
During the last decade ‘crisis’ and ‘crisis management’ have been at the centre of most 
discussions related to the European Union (EU) member states under financial assistance 
programmes.  Nonetheless the academic literature is very limited.  Boin, Hart and McConnell 
(2009) in their article on crisis exploitation argue that once it has been accepted that a crisis 
has erupted, the centre of attention turns to the causes of the crisis which often involves 
blame shifting and a significant degree of ‘exogenisation’.  The main characteristic of 
‘exogenisation’ is an attempt to shift accountability for the crisis from the government to 
outside factors.  Such factors can include natural events (e.g. tsunami or forest fires) or the 
unexpected actions of ‘outgroups’ (e.g. Islamic radicals, ‘anarchists’, greedy corporate 
managers etc).  This does not mean that blame shift is not common practice beyond crisis, 
when governments are trying to avoid accountability for corruption scandals or day-to-day 
public administration failures.  What is argued here is that this phenomenon and its political 
and policy implications are exacerbated during crises because it allows for more complex 
‘exogenisation’ processes which will be discussed further.  Crisis is defined as “events or 
developments widely perceived by members of relevant communities to constitute urgent 
threats to core community values and structures” (Boin, Hart and McConnell, 2009, p. 83).   
The discussion of blame attribution which is very much related to blame shifting is not new.  
Powell and Whitten (1993) in their seminal article correlate the clarity of the responsibility for 
economic failures such as high unemployment, lack of growth etc. with voting behaviors and 
conclude that economic voting strongly interacts with political responsibility attribution.  
Since the eruption of the Eurozone crisis the discussion of blame attribution and voting 
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behavior has re-gained ground.  Karyotis and Ruedig (2015) explore the way blame attribution 
relates to the weakening of the Panellinio Sosialistiko Kenema (Panhellenic Socialist 
Movement, (PASOK) which was in power when the First Economic Adjustment Programme for 
Greece (2010) was signed.  Their research is based on opinion poll analysis.  Although they 
expected that blaming external actors such as the EU would affect voting choices, they find 
that this is not the case.  Blaming the large parties (PASOK and Nea Democratia (New 
Democracy, ND) that have traditionally held power seems to constitute an important 
dimension of blame attribution.  We will return to that later.  Further relevant literature that 
has been developed is that of blame attribution by the media during the crisis (Capelos and 
Exadaktylos, 2015; Roose et al., 2017; Von Scheve, Zink and Ismer, 2016).  Although the focus 
of this research is more sociological and is interested in the emotions of blame attribution, it 
also shows that in the case of Greece blame attribution in the media has been directed more 
towards the domestic political system than towards external actors.  In this article we turn our 
attention away from the general public and the media to an actor which has been 
understudied although it plays a central role in blame shift: the political parties’ elites via the 
analysis of their parliamentary discourse during the crisis.     
The crisis in Greece and its effects upon the political discourse has been a topic of analysis 
since early 2009. Papadimitriou and Zarlatoulids (2015), for instance, examined the discourse 
of European policy makers on the initial stages of the crisis, highlighting such themes as 
corruption and chronic mismanagement that resulted in elevated levels of mistrust between 
Greek governments and the EU. Closer to the approach of this research, Vasilopoulou et al. 
(2014), conducting content analysis of parliamentary speeches, argued that the two 
mainstream parties of PASOK and ND engaged in mutual criticism and blame shifting for the 
crisis and the failure to initiate successful reforms over the years.  Empirically, it is important 
to continue this work further in time. Additionally, Hatzidaki and Goutsos (2017) combine 
research on the Greek crisis discourse with various methodological perspectives for a better 
understanding of the Greek crisis as a socioeconomic episode and as a discourse construct. 
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This research provides a new perspective on blame attribution by moving forward from 
focusing on existing theories of scapegoating and electoral strategies before the crisis to 
elaborating the theory of ‘exogenisation’ of blame during the crisis and its implication for the 
political system and policy reform processes of crisis-ridden countries. 
More specifically, blame shifting is important not only because it affects voting behaviors but 
also because it determines policy change.  Although crises and critical junctures are often seen 
as instances when policy change is more likely to occur, this has not always been the case in 
the EU member-states under financial assistance programmes during the Eurozone crisis (Ladi, 
2014).  This could be because often the aim is not to find viable solutions but to shift the 
blame.  It has been suggested that the increase in populist discourse and blame-shifting during 
crisis may undermine agenda-setting and the implementation of policy or reforms (Ladi, 
2016).  Problems during the crisis have often been defined not with a focus on the introduction 
of reforms but rather by aiming to find somebody to blame for the problem and thus for the 
crisis.  This was the case with the problem of youth unemployment in Greece during the crisis 
years. Although the issue was not new, it was framed by emphasizing that it was exacerbated 
due to austerity. This meant that the blame was shifted to the troika (European Commission, 
EC; European Central Bank, ECB; International Monetary Fund, IMF). Long-standing 
endogenous parameters of the problem such as the lack of a growth strategy or the self-
serving higher education system were hushed up. The ‘exogenisation’ of the crisis by policy 
makers meant that long-standing endogenous causes of the problem were overlooked. 
Instead, a populist discourse put emphasis on emotions and on shifting the blame to an 
exogenous ‘enemy’.  Such a discourse closed opportunities for meaningful agenda-setting and 
viable solutions, undermined the ownership of the austerity measures and may have led to 
false promises.   
The ‘exogenisation’ of the crisis serves politicians and policy-makers whose primary aim is to 
avoid blame.  As Weaver (1986) suggested, politicians are very often motivated by their desire 
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to avoid blame for unpopular action or policy mistakes rather than to claim credit for popular 
actions.  Frames that ‘exogenise’ accountability often refer to forces of nature, ‘outgroups’ or 
uncontrollable events such as economic recession.    What is revealed by the Greek crisis, 
which adds to the complexity but may explain a lot, is that ‘exogenisation’ may take even more 
complicated forms than blaming an ‘external enemy’ such as the EU.  In the case of Greece 
during the Eurozone crisis the ‘exogenisation’ concerned the ‘external enemy’ as well as what 
was portrayed as the ‘old establishment’ which was presented as colluding with the ‘external 
enemy’. In such cases, as Mair (2009) argues, to mobilize against the government equals 
mobilizing against the EU since a lot of the policies now derive from the EU level — and this is 
pointed out by ‘protest’ parties, especially during crises. It is common for ‘protest’ parties that 
have gained momentum because of the crisis to emphasise such‘ exogenisation’ and blame 
centre parties which were traditionally the parties of government – what is called the ‘old 
establishment’ (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017). For this leap to be successful the ‘old 
establishment’ needs to be directly connected with the ‘external enemy’.  If this is the case, 
the ‘exogenisation’ of the crisis in the EU member states under financial assistance 
programmes would be portrayed by a shift of blame for both the crisis and the proposed 
solutions to the EU and the troika.  This argument is further explored by analysing data on 
parliamentary discourse.  
Interestingly, when these political forces become members of governing coalitions the 
‘exogenisation’ of the crisis appears to decline.  This can be seen as evidence of the old 
dilemma of representative versus responsible government (Mair, 2009).  ‘Protest’ parties 
during crisis act as representatives – amongst others - by articulating interests that are losing 
their ground due to sudden changes as well as to citizens' disappointment and anger.  They 
often express all these in radical terms by ‘exogenising’ the crisis and the solutions agreed in 
the way described above and proposing new, fundamentally different political programs.  
When they come to government they have to deliver on their promises, and this becomes 
almost impossible since they have to act in a responsible way and deliver in areas that are not 
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about politics but about policy, continuity and prior international agreements (Mair, 2009; 
Morlino and Raniolo, 2017).  Compromise is often inevitable, since the implementation of a 
fundamentally different political program would normally signify very high costs.  The case of 
Synaspismos Rizospastikis Aristeras (Coalition of the Radical Left, SYRIZA) and the U-turn in 
their political decisions and policies implemented after the 2015 referendum shows how their 
role and discourse while in opposition could not be the same when in government.  In order 
to act responsibly and avoid the possibility of Grexit, they had to make bargains with some of 
their representativeness’ (Morlino and Raniolo, 2017).   
Background to the Greek case study  
The financial crisis of 2008 was based on the combination of debt and leverage of financial 
proliferation and securitisation, resulting in imbalances in trade, investment and consumption 
(Morgan, 2009). The Eurozone crisis which started in 2009 as a result of the 2008 global 
financial crisis, and more specifically its impact upon Greece, is a telling case-study for 
exploring blame shifting in parliamentary discourse during crisis.  In this section, a brief 
consideration of the changing situation in Greece is presented in order to contextualise this 
blame shifting.  What is observed is an attempt to ‘exogenise’ accountability for the crisis and 
to frame it as the result of the international economic recession and/or the failure of the 
Eurozone.  It is important to note that the first step for this ‘exogenisation’ is the exposure of 
the ‘internal allies’ of these exogenous factors. These ‘internal allies’ are elements of the ‘old’ 
political establishment which is blamed for its choices and for surrendering to the pressures 
of the European partners.  The crisis is thus defined as mainly international and/or European 
but it is often claimed that it has been exacerbated because of the actions of the ‘old’ 
establishment2. 
                                                          
2During the period of the three Programmes (2009-2015), the Greek political scene can be separated 
into three major competing groups. Speaking in terms of the left-right scale of the political scene in 
Greece, PASOK, ND, and POTAMI represent the centre, Laikos Orthodoxos Synagermos (Popular 
Orthodox Rally, LAOS) the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn and Anexartitoi Ellines (Independent Greeks, ANEL) 
the right, and Kommounistiko Komma Elladas (Communist Party of Greece, KKE) and SYRIZA the left. 
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The Greek economy was in a recessionary phase in 2008, with continuous declines in inflation 
and rising unemployment levels. Nevertheless, the causes of the Greek financial crisis arise 
from chronic aggravating problems and policy decisions that have been implemented along 
with the financial and economic global crisis. The increase in public debt in combination with 
the country's recession since 2008, resulted in the Greek economy being particularly 
vulnerable to the effects of the 2008 global crisis, and this ultimately required the use of a 
support mechanism in order to avoid its permanent cessation. As a result of this situation, 
Prime Minister George Papandreou publicly announced in 2009 that the Greek public deficit 
figures had been understated, resulting in the start of an austerity trail in 2010. A key axis of 
the strategy was to tie up fiscal adjustment and restart the real economy so that the country 
might escape the vicious cycle of deficits and recession. However, the results weren’t the ones 
anticipated, and the capacity of the country to borrow from the financial markets weakened, 
placing Greece at the epicentre of the Eurozone debt crisis (Dinas and Rori, 2013). 
Since 2010 there have been three Economic Adjustment Programs (2010, 2012 and 2015) and 
a total loan of 326 billion Euros has been negotiated with the troika, to which the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM) was added in 2015.  The negotiations and the terms agreed 
comprised harsh austerity measures including deep budget cuts, tax increases, privatizations, 
a wide range of structural reforms, and a demand for curbing tax evasion.  In the meantime, 
by 2014 Greek GDP had fallen by almost 26% and unemployment had risen to almost 27% 
(Eurostat, 2015), with youth unemployment reaching 50% in the first months of 2016. In 2014 
the Greek government managed to access the markets for the first time after some of the 
structural reforms had been concluded and a modest surplus had been achieved.  
Nevertheless, by 2015 the public debt to GDP ratio was 177,4% (Eurostat, 2016).  Voices inside 
and outside the country were pointing to both the unsustainability of the Greek debt and the 
ineffectiveness of the austerity measures, and serious disagreement between the IMF and the 
European partners continues to this day (i.e. Ekathimerini, 7/2/17).  
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Despite these mildly positive figures, reform fatigue and a domestic political deadlock led to 
the snap parliamentary elections of January 2015 which led to the fall of the Samaras 
government.  A SYRIZA-led coalition government came into power.  The political system of 
Greece has effectively been in turmoil since 2010 and this is why it is necessary to conduct an 
analysis of the changing parliamentary discourse. The political changes since 2010 can be 
described as the end of the ‘old’ political system and the emergence of new parties, coalitions 
and dynamics.  There are the three main changes that can be observed.   First, the two centrist 
parties that dominated Greece’s political scene since the transition to democracy in 1974 have 
lost ground.  PASOK, the socialist party which was in power when the crisis initially erupted, 
fell from approximately 44% of the vote in 2009 to 4.7% in the January 2015 elections.  The 
conservative ND lost approximately 9.5% of the vote from the 2012 elections, collecting 
36.34%, while the fascist Golden Dawn was strengthened, acquiring 6.9% of the vote, gaining 
17 parliamentary seats (Hellenic Ministry of Interior, 2015) and becoming the third largest 
party in parliament.  The big winner in the crisis was the radical left SYRIZA, which rose from 
4.6% of the vote in 2009 to 36.3% in January 2015 and thus won. As Rori (2016) points out, 
since the 2012 elections an economic approach to voting attitude seems to explain the flow 
of voters towards SYRIZA in 2015, partly as a protest vote against the economic decisions of 
the previous coalition government that led to the second bailout (Konstantinidis, 2015). 
Second, coalition governments have replaced strong one-party governments which used to 
be the norm in Greek politics.  Since 2015 the country is governed by a paradoxical coalition 
between the ‘radical’ left-wing party, SYRIZA, a party whose programme is still based on the 
Marxist theory of class struggle (Pappas and Aslanidis 2015), and the radical right-wing party 
ANEL that emerged as a spin-off from ND.  A typical case of a populist radical right-wing party, 
following Mudde’s (2007) definitions, ANEL constructs a narrative of the people in ethnic 
terms and combines traditional themes of the conservative right-wing agenda such as anti-
immigration, religion and the role of the family. The previous governing coalition formed after 
the 2012 elections comprised the socialist PASOK, the conservative ND and the pro-European 
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left-wing Demokratiki Aristera (Democratic Left, DIMAR), although the latter subsequently 
disagreed with some of the measures and left the coalition. Coalition governments in Greece 
are seen as more fragile than one-party governments and they invariably do not last full four-
year terms. 
Third, internal political debate in Greece was reduced to a memorandum/ anti-memorandum 
cleavage that after the Tsipras government’s shift to adopting the third Economic Adjustment 
Programme was succeeded by a Euro versus ‘return to a national currency’ cleavage.  The 
crisis in Greece was increasingly framed as a ‘war’ with the European partners and especially 
the Germans who were perceived as the ‘enemy’ or the ‘occupying force’ (in the most extreme 
versions of this discourse) (Dinas and Rori, 2013; Lowen 2015).  The agreement on a third bail-
out package, which halted a race towards default and potentially a Grexit, was presented as a 
‘coup’ against the government (ekathimerini.com, 15/7/2015).  This provocative discourse of 
the government and often of the opposition has repeatedly been described as populist and is 
the focus of our analysis in this article.  Pappas (2014) has described Greece as a populist 
democracy exemplified by three characteristics: first, a single dominant division between the 
good ‘people’ and the evil ‘establishment’; second, conflict and polarization rather than 
consensus and moderation as the preferred political mode; and third, the centrality of 
personal authority which counts more than the impersonal institutions and the rule of law.  A 
content analysis of the first years of the crisis argues for a populist discourse by all parties in 
Parliament, with an emphasis on blame-shifting (Vasilopoulou et. al. 2014).  We aim to move 
this research forward and further analyse the blame-shifting, assess and explain its variations 
across parties and time. 
Research questions and methodology 
Two main questions are put forward based on what has been outlined above and are further 
explored by means of analysis of the parliamentary discourse during the vote on the three 
Economic Adjustment Programmes. First, can ‘exogenisation’ of the crisis and blame-shifting 
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be much more complex than just blaming exogenous factors? During the Greek crisis the ‘old 
establishment’ which was the ‘internal ally’ of the EU was the first entity to be blamed and as 
a consequence the EU, the IMF, the West and globalization more generally were also blamed.  
And second, does this ‘exogenisation’ and blame-shifting discourse softens when opposition 
and protest parties enter government and therefore are pushed to act responsibly? In the 
case of Greece there is such evidence both during the conservative Samaras government 
(2012), which held an anti-memorandum position before his election but then implemented 
the reforms, and during the radical left SYRIZA government (2015) which eventually acted in 
a very similar way to all previous governments.      
Where ‘exogenisation’ reflects the shifting of blame for the crisis from the government to 
exogenous factors we expect that:  
H1: ‘Εxogenisation’ discourse of both the causes of the problem and the responsibility (blame 
shifting) over solutions, is prominent during the crisis. Discourse levels differ between the 
political ‘eras’ signified by the three Economic Adjustment Programmes and between party 
leaders and MPs. 
H2: ‘Εxogenisation’ discourse levels are higher for parties in opposition than for the governing 
party. A prominent mechanism of blame shifting when in government is to evade focusing on 
the real problem. 
With regard to the operationalisation of the key concept ‘exogenisation’, we focus on the 
analysis of texts. Texts have been a major tool used to examine the identity of political parties. 
They are utilised in our research to examine the level and type of ‘exogenisation’ in 
parliamentary debate on the three Economic Adjustment Programmes signed between 
Greece and its creditors in return for loans. For the purposes of this research, ‘exogenisation’ 
is about what and who is to be blamed for the ongoing crisis. Looking at the original texts of 
the parliamentary debates, there are two main actors, the established political scene and the 
EU.  It is important to compare the blame-shifting over time along with the parties that stand 
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in favour or against the memoranda, to identify possible patterns and differences within their 
discourse with regard to their role when in government. Additionally, it is equally important 
to measure the populist argument of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ in order to highlight the level of 
identification with the people, who have been forced to face the ongoing crisis by those 
responsible for causing it.  
Our research uses content analysis in order to isolate and measure ‘exogenisation’ focusing 
on the discourse of party MPs and party leaders. Although we would expect the analysis of 
such discourse to have similar results for both MPs and leaders, it is interesting to examine 
intra-party variations, especially differences in the ‘exogenisation’ intonation of the discourse 
of party leaders and party MPs. In all three Economic Adjustment Programmes many members 
of the governing parties were not supportive of the proposed measures.  This was especially 
the case in 2015 and the coalition government of SYRIZA-ANEL, which followed an anti-
memorandum discourse throughout its electoral campaign. Having said that, it is worth noting 
that of all parties which voted on the bailouts, SYRIZA has had the least losses in parliamentary 
votes. Even after it split in the summer of 2015, it remained the only party which maintained 
such a high level of discipline when voting for austerity measures. ND and PASOK lost a lot 
more MPs whilst voting for the bailouts (Rori, 2016). Given the levels of dissent and challenges 
that leaders had to face during the parliamentary votes with respect to party discipline, the 
distinction between party leader and MPs seems rather essential to address our research 
question.  
Despite the existing literature on party leaders’ speeches, there is a relative lack of research 
focusing specifically on parliamentary speeches by party leaders. In a party conference 
context, for instance, Finlayson and Marring (2008) explored the contribution of political 
speeches to understanding political institutions, ideologies and strategies, by analysing the 
rhetoric of Tony Blair’s last speech as PM, while Pettit (2012) focuses on identifying civic 
republicanism in Spain by analysing José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero's speeches as an PM. There 
are also some parallel studies on televised leadership debates using content analysis (Bastien 
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2018; Allen, Bara and Bartle 2010). In this article, what we do is separate the party leader and 
the party MPs in a parliamentary context, in order to make comparisons on their stance in the 
parliament and explore how this dilemma of representative versus responsible government is 
articulated in parliamentary discourse in this separate role of actors.  
We examine the parliamentary debates using qualitative content analysis. The first stage of 
the analysis focuses on a manual examination of the text itself, in terms of providing a 
systematic and objective study of both the characteristics and context of the ‘message’. A 
comparison of the changes regarding the level of ‘exogenisation’ over time is undertaken in 
order to compare the changes in party parliamentary discourse over parties and time. In its 
second stage, the project uses HAMLET II software to conduct qualitative computer assisted 
textual analysis (CATA). As Bara, Weale and Bicquelet (2007) stress in their work on the 
analysis of parliamentary debates with computer assistance, a ‘semi-automated’ CATA is an 
efficient approach for examining and measuring assumptions about policies and political 
behaviour (2007, p. 580). The measurement of the research, therefore, relies on this 
dictionary tactic in which the share of words that are considered to be indicators are counted 
(Rooduijn and Pauwels, 2011).  
Therefore, such coding has been done by assigning the text to pre-established categories 
which are formed on the basis of four specific topics (seven categories): the people (referring 
to the populist argument ‘we’ as the ‘people’ we represent),  attitudes towards the 
established political scene (pro-consensual, anti-establishment), attitudes towards the EU and 
international factors (pro-EU/International, anti-EU/international) and attitudes towards the 
memorandum (pro-memorandum, anti-memorandum) (see Appendix 2). The units of analysis 
for this project are the parliamentary debates, whereas the units of measurement contain 
words and phrases identified in the text and reflect the established categories, following the 
example of recent works that have dealt with the concept and the ability to measure populism 
(quantitative: Panizza 2005, qualitative: Taggart 1996, Mudde 2007, computer-based: Armory 
and Armory 2005, human-coded content analysis: Jagers and Walgrave 2007, Hawkins 2009). 
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Discussion and Findings  
Reflecting back to the work of Boin, Hart and McConnell (2009), the results of our analysis 
highlight a pattern of blame-shifting on the ongoing economic and political crisis, in which the 
blame shifts from internal factors (e.g. established political scene and the government) to 
exogenous factors (e.g. EU) (H1). And while we rarely see the government taking responsibility 
for its previous actions, with the exception of Papandreou in 2010, in most of the cases the 
‘exogenisation’ points clearly to the ‘old’ establishment, the major parties that created the 
dipole in the country's political scene: ND and PASOK (H1). The stronger results arising from 
the analysis of the data reflect the shift in the behaviour of opposition parties, and mainly of 
SYRIZA before and after it formed a government in 2015 (H2).  
Our findings validate our H1. Although this research does not compare levels with non-crisis 
periods, the data points to prominent ‘exogenisation’ discourse of both causes and 
responsibility (blame shifting) over solutions during the crisis. This suggests a higher level of 
blame-shifting and direct references to the people from the opposition parties rather than the 
governing party which introduces and supports the Economic Adjustment Programme to the 
Parliament.   
Looking at the cases individually, in terms of party leaders and party MPs across all three 
parliamentary debates, a few conclusions can be drawn. Our results point to an overall 
maximum score of negative references to ‘the establishment’. More specifically, the content 
of the 2010 debate indicates a ‘historical blame-shifting’ attribution context for the crisis 
against the established political scene and governments, dating back to the regime change 
after 1974.  This is the case at a leadership level, from both parties in opposition (SYRIZA and 
LAOS) but also from the governing party (PASOK), with the latter focusing more specifically on 
deflecting the blame from previous PASOK governments to those of the conservative party of 
ND between 2004 and 2009. 
This ‘historical blame-shifting’ highlights the responsibility for policy errors by previous 
governments and the inability of the status quo parties (mainly PASOK and ND) to govern, as 
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they are the ones responsible for leading the country into the crisis. Papandreou's discourse 
in 2010 is characterised by the common PASOK attitude at the time, trying not to ‘exogenise’ 
but also to ‘endogenise’ the blame that led the country to the first memorandum, in an effort 
to underline the responsibility of political actors but also of individual citizens in an attempt 
to unify the country.  
Having said that, attention on ‘exogenisation’ does not only focus on internal factors. From 
both right (LAOS and Golden Dawn) and left (SYRIZA and KKE), the responsibility for the crisis 
is placed on the EU and international factors (see Figure 1 and Appendix 3, Figures 2, 3 and 
4)3. It is the EU and its assertive policies since Greece's accession to the EU that created the 
circumstances and the fertile ground for the crisis, according to this discourse. These external 
factors were obvious scapegoats and the targets of negative discourse even prior the crisis, 
especially from the actors of the extreme parties (Golden Dawn and KKE). Bringing the EU and 
IMF into the debate also points to a global dimension of the crisis, redirecting the blame to 
something greater and therefore beyond national control and accountability. What is also 
interesting is the populist appeal to ‘the people’, or in other words the identification of those 
that stand against the established system and the foreign influences – not only by party 
leaders but also by MPs from all parties represented in the parliament in all three bailout 
debates (see Figure 1 and Appendix 3, Figure 5). By emphasising this discourse, the parties 
make a clear distinction between ‘them’ (the actors responsible for the crisis) and ‘us’, a direct 
reference to the ‘people’, the electorate, the only blameless ones against whom these 
injustices have been taking place.  
In relation to the ‘exogenisation’ a further aspect that needs to be examined is the 
positivecontent towards both internal and external factors, along with comments on the 
proposed policies as part of the loan deal. As expected, most of the positive references come 
                                                          
3 Figures 1, 2 and 3 are horizontal bar graphs, distributing bars along the y-axis. Elements in the same 
row of a matrix are grouped together, in this case the categories. Each bar represents one category, 
and the total salience of each category in each case of parliamentary discourse. Therefore, the length 
of each shade in the bar represents the salience % of each actor (party MPs or leader). 
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from the parties in government, arguing in favour of the memorandum, both on a party and 
party leader level (ANEL in 2015, Papandreou in 2012 and Tsipras in 2015) (see Figure 1 and 
Appendix 3, Figure 4). Similarly, we see positive comments towards the established political 
scene and parliament by governing parties, when seeking collaboration and support on the 
upcoming parliamentary vote of the austerity measures (Samaras in 2012, ANEL in 2015 and 
Papandreou in 2010). Interestingly, there is also a small but rather noticeable trend among 
several opposition parties in favour of mutual collaboration for a solution to the crisis, going 
beyond the variable of blame-shifting towards a concerted effort to end the crisis.  
Furthermore, there is a limitation to directly addressing the negative aspect of the proposed 
austerity measures, with the anti-memorandum discourse coming once more from the right 
(Golden Dawn in 2015 and LAOS in 2012) and left (KKE in 2010 and 2015 and Tsipras from 
SYRIZA in 2015) (see Figure 1 and Appendix 3, Figures 2, 3, and 4). And while one would expect 
this attitude from the communist and neo-fascist parties, since they have been keeping a 
consistent negative attitude from the outset, the stance of the governing and coalition 
governing parties is rather interesting. In these cases the leadership and party MPs stress the 
necessity of the austerity measures while at the same time distancing themselves from the 
responsibility their parties bear. In other words, governing parties acknowledge the 
importance of the austerity measures and therefore they present an argumentation on the 
choice to bring these measures to the parliament for approval, at the same time eschewing 
the ownership of the austerity measures by not focusing on their role in the process. This 
could be interpreted as an attempt to minimise electoral losses but also to acknowledge the 
negative effects of austerity.  
As regards the initial assumption that the leader is in line with the party, the findings point to 
a significant difference across the three Economic Adjustment Programmes debates. The 
populist appeal is registered higher at a leader level in comparison to party MPs (Papandreou 
and Tsipras in 2010, Genimmata in 2015), as well as putting the blame on the ‘old 
establishment’ (again by Papandreou and Tsipras in 2010). Papandreou at the time appears 
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to make an appeal to the people by highlighting the importance of the bailout programme as 
a requirement for the country to survive the economic crisis. At the same time (as stated 
above) this does not deny the responsibility of his party for its contribution to the crisis 
throughout its previous time in government.  In the case of the 2015 debate, for SYRIZA the 
difference is on the ‘anti-memorandum’ discourse, where Tsipras, despite being the prime 
minister presenting the bailout programme, registers high scores, a high rate of +1.97% in 
comparison to his party’s score. Finally, ANEL is also a case where party leader and party follow 
a rather different discourse. Significantly, at a party level we see rather high scores on ‘pro-
memorandum’ and ‘pro-consensus’ in comparison to their party leader Kammenos, with -
2.24% and -2.5% respectively (see Figure 1 and Appendix 3, Figure 5).  What appears to be the 
case here is that the party leader scores higher in rates of populism whereas the party shares 
a higher rate of responsibility. This disparity at intra-party level, especially in the case of SYRIZA 
and ANEL in 2015, highlights a trend of differentiation between leader and MPs as regards the 
proposed bailout plan. Kammenos responds to the popular appeal of the electorate, where 
MPs pledge to their responsibility to provide explanations and argue in favour of the bailout 
plan to explain their supporting vote (see Appendix 1). 
We now examine further our H2, that ‘exogenisation’ discourse levels are higher for parties in 
opposition than for the governing party. This necessitated a manual examination of the 
original documents and their context so as to identify potential external factors that influence 
their focus. The initial analysis points to a rather similar discourse in 2010 and 2012, although 
this changes in 2015: it is the year when three new parties enter the debate —Golden Dawn, 
ANEL and POTAMI— while there is a change in the leadership of PASOK, KKE and ND. And 
while the focus of ‘exogenisation’ appears to remain the same for KKE and PASOK, both at 
party and leader level, there is a change in the cases of SYRIZA and ND, especially concerning 
the MPs at the party level.  
Golden Down and POTAMI in 2015 have the highest score of targeting the established political 
scene with 5.41% and 5.1%, respectively. Since both have entered the debate for the first 
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time, this may reflect their alternative rhetoric against the established elite that led the 
country to this ongoing crisis. Golden Dawn, for instance, seems to emphasise this specific 
aspect by invoking with strong words the ‘cynical’ attitude of the previous government and 
referring to it as a ‘deception’ that led to ‘bloodstained’ measures and the ‘destruction’ of the 
country, a modern national ‘tragedy’ (Golden Dawn, 2015). POTAMI on the other hand focuses 
mainly on the governance and anti-memorandum discourse of SYRIZA before and after the 
election of 2015, highlighting the irony of SYRIZA, perceived for the first time as 
‘establishment’, being the one to introduce a new Memorandum to the parliament. The party 
invokes the SYRIZA government's ‘lies’ and ‘divisive’ rhetoric along with the ‘propaganda of 
heroism’ that isolates the country within the European family (POTAMI, 2015). Golden Dawn 
accuses the previous regimes whereas POTAMI focuses on the emerging radical actors of the 
crisis. Additionally, this difference between the two parties can be explained by the difference 
stance in the pro (POTAMI) /anti (Golden Dawn) memorandum cleavage that affects their 
blame attribution. An additional factor is that POTAMI has been seeking to form a coalition 
with SYRIZA since its inception, even before the elections of 2015. Remaining outside the 
coalition enables the party to take advantage of its role as opposition and exogenise the blame 
attribution towards the government.  
With regard to H2 it appears that the ‘exogenisation’ discourse levels are higher for opposition 
parties, thus supporting our initial expectations on shifting content. This is especially evident 
in the case of SYRIZA at party level since coming to power in 2015, by shifting from references 
to ‘the people’ (-1.18%) to the blame-shifting of the inner political scene (-1.27%). A similar 
but rather small positive shift can be observed in the cases of the leaders of PASOK 
(Papandreou) and ND (Meimarakis), when placed in opposition in 2015, e.g. +1.83% against 
the political established scene by ND. (see Figure 1 and Appendix 3, Figure 5). 
Looking more closely at the 2015 debate, another interesting observation concerns the lowest 
rates of ‘exogenisation’ by both governing parties, SYRIZA and ANEL, and also by the 
opposition (ND). In the case of ND, when looking at the original text of the debate we see an 
 20 
emphasis on the voting procedure, along with a focus on the shift on the memorandum 
discourse of SYRIZA before and after the election of 2015. SYRIZA underscores the 
‘contradictions’ the party and its MPs have been falling into by using direct examples from 
government policy since winning the election. At the same time the rhetoric praises the 
‘responsibility’ that ND has demonstrated throughout its time in government since 1974 (ND, 
2015). In the cases of SYRIZA at party level and of ANEL’s leader Kammenos, a common 
observation can be made. In comparison to the content of the previous memoranda debates, 
that of 2015 lacks focus on the debate, creating a sense of evasion. In SYRIZA’s case the party’s 
attention is drawn more to technicalities about procedure and specific amendments on the 
agreement presented to Parliament for approval. In the case of ANEL the emphasis is on a 
pro-consensual call on the rest of the parties, highlighting the ‘dire’ necessity of the measures 
and urging them to avoid any possible ‘sabotage’ (Kammenos/ANEL, 2015). It also appears 
that Kammenos’s rhetoric is drawn specifically to issues relating to the military e.g. pensions, 
potential career developments and the exploitation of the military forces' assets. Despite not 
having a comparison with the previous debate experiences, what is obvious in the case of 
ANEL and its leader is the effort to highlight the military as a priority area for both himself and 
his party and a field of constant disagreement with their coalition partner, SYRIZA. Kammenos, 
at the same time, avoids addressing the memorandum itself, which is also at odds with the 
party’s pre-election anti-memoranda rhetoric. This fragmentation at policy level could be 
interpreted as driven by the electoral interests of the party and the desire to circumvent any 
generalised position-taking which would be inevitably associated with blame attribution 
against ANEL in the future. Equally, SYRIZA’s focus on technicalities arises from an effort not 
to be seen to succumb to national and international pressure and emphasise blame attribution 
in order to ‘exogenise’ the blame. Based on the outputs presented above, the analysis points 
also to a validation of our H2. Summing up the points of our main narrative, the level of 
populistic appeal appears to decrease when a party is in government (see Figure 1). This also 
points to the argument of responsibility versus responsiveness governments.  Parties feel the 
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pressure to deliver when in government, therefore they shift their discourse towards the need 
for responsibility, moving away from responsiveness to people’s demands. Therefore, 
exogenisation cannot be disconnected from the general goal of political parties to maximise 
their vote share; in their effort to pursue office, they seek and promote policies relevant to 
their cause and interests.  
 
Figure 1: Overview of salience of parliamentary discourse by leader and by party over time  
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Concluding remarks 
The aim of this research has been to explore blame attribution discourse and understand how 
it affects the dynamics of representative versus responsive government in times of crisis. We 
analyse the mechanisms of the ‘exogenisation’ of the crisis and how they develop through 
time (2009-2015) in Greece, how party leaders and MPs express blame attribution differently 
and how the discourse alters when a party enters the government.  The case of Greece during 
the period of the three Economic Adjustment Programmes (2009-2015) offers fertile ground 
for moving forward the literature on blame-shifting, blame attribution and exogenisation of 
the crisis.  
It has been shown in this article that blame shifting can be much more sophisticated than 
simply directing blame for the crisis and its ineffective remedies towards exogenous factors 
(e.g. the EU and the troika).  It can involve elements of populist discourse and it can be directly 
linked to domestic political debate where the mainstream centrist political parties (ND, 
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PASOK) are blamed by the ‘protest’ parties (SYRIZA, ANEL, Golden Dawn) for allying with the 
EU and betraying the ‘people’ before and during the crisis.  This is what we call ‘historical 
blame-shifting’.  The key about ‘historical blame-shifting’ is that it allows the government in 
office to renounce its accountability, since the mistakes of the past are blamed for today’s 
failures.  
A second finding is that party leaders communicate blame shifting with a much stronger and 
often populist discourse in comparison to party members.  Throughout the three 
parliamentary debates party leaders target the blame towards the ‘old establishment’ and 
indirectly towards the EU and the troika.  They often appeal to the ‘people’, who are the only 
blameless actors.  This finding is in line with the ‘exogenisation’ literature which claims that 
policy-makers have as a priority to shift the attention from the government to exogenous 
factors (Boin, Hart and McConnell, 2009), but moves the debate further by outlining that 
political parties aiming to govern do the same and that party leaders are much more polemic 
than MPs in their discourse.  Further research is necessary in order to discover more variations 
that may exist in the blame attribution discourse (e.g. age or gender factors).   
Finally, in the case of Greece in crisis the ‘exogenisation’ of the blame creates a trend, a 
generalised shift of blame and a change of strategy depending on whether a party is in 
government or in opposition. Our research indicates that there is a special weight on the 
importance of blame-shifting towards the EU and the main electoral rival while in opposition, 
a trend that instantly decreases when the party comes to power.  This is in line with Mair’s 
(2009) 'representative versus responsible government' argument and moves the debate 
further by showing how the controversial and often populist discourse of protest parties 
smoothens when in government.  This is not to justify such a discourse or to say that 
‘exogenisation’ is positive but to demonstrate that these kinds of strategies are by nature 
short-term since they cannot last once in government. The most telling example is that of the 
anti-memorandum and anti-establishment discourse of SYRIZA and ANEL: starting as protest 
parties that organised rallies against the bailouts in the first years of the crisis, once they had 
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a formed a powerful governing coalition they supported policies that were crucial to their 
success.   This shift has enabled the implementation of some of the reforms attached to the 
third Economic Adjustment Programme.  Whether these reforms are well-rooted or whether 
they will be reversed after the end of the Programme and/or when a new government comes 
to power should be the focus of further research. 
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Appendix 1 
Content analysis of parliamentary debates on exogenisation of blame 
In content analysis the text is separated into smaller units of analysis (Krippendorff, 1980) with 
a main goal to see if a structure content of text can support the main argument. The outputs 
from the analysis showed that none of the selected categories were normally distributed, as 
revealed by Shapiro-Wilk’s test (p < .05). Having said that, Spearman’s rank order correlation 
was conducted to the established categories and determined that a moderate correlation 
appears in some cases e.g. positive attitudes towards the consensus and the EU/international 
(r=0.499, p=0.000, n=34) as well as being in favour of the proposed measures (r=0.715, 
p=0.000, n=34). In other words, the parties and leaders that support the memorandum in each 
case, also have a positive discourse towards the European and international partners and talk 
in favour of a consensus within the national parliament. There is additionally a negative 
correlation between negative attitudes towards austerity measures and positive attitudes 
towards the EU/International (r=-0.589, p=0.000, n=34) as well as attitude against the 
established political scene and positive discourse towards the proposed austerity measures 
(r=-0.405, p=0.000, n=34) and pro-consensus and anti-austerity measures (r=-0.521, p=0.000, 
n=34). More specifically, as expected, on the opposite side, actors that note high salience on 
their anti-establishment discourse signify a low salience on their support of the proposed 
memorandum and equally, actors supporting a consensus within the national parliament have 
low salience against the austerity measures.  
 
Appendix 2 
Dictionary of the computer-based content analysis (plus synonyms) 
As Miles and Huberman (1994) underline, content analysis is a procedure for identifying and 
classifying substantial patterns in text through the application of coding.  The ‘semi-
automated’ characterisation refers to the HAMLET II requirement of preparation of a coding 
system, which involves a general vocabulary of key words and terminology on the basis of 
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which the analysis is conducted by searching for ‘inter-connections between a number of key 
words that occur in a text and explore word and category associations’ (HAMLET IIsoftware 
manual, 2013, p. 4).  Further explanation of such coding technique is derived from work by 
Titscher et al. (2000), where they define categories as an alternative effective definition of 
variables within the components of text under examination, in this case parliamentary 
debates. Overall, the software produces data on the basis of strategic words which are of 
significance to our hypotheses. The categories constructed for this research are based on 
general themes and reflect a broad spectrum of blame shifting that parties include in their 
parliamentary discourse on the specific debates under analysis.  
An additional feature of HAMLET II is that it allows for the analysis of individual speakers as 
well as the analysis of each debate as a whole. Finally, it must be pointed out that despite the 
fact that only a small proportion of the words used as dictionary inputs are represented in the 
texts themselves, this is regarded as adequate to highlight salience in this form of research 
(Bara et al. 2007, Trantidis and Tsagkroni, 2017). In any form of category-based content 
analysis, the majority of words in a given text are present because of grammatical or linguistic 
convention or refer to topics not under scrutiny in the given research. In our case for instance, 
the total sum of the 7 categories entries for Tsipras signifies only some 9.59% in 2010, 8.87% 
in 2012 and 9.06% in 2015.  
This research defines a blame shifting index where society is being divided between the 
‘people’ (‘citizens’, ‘society’, ‘country’ ‘we’ as the ‘people’) and the ‘establishment’, referring 
to the national political scene (’corrupt’, ‘capital’, ‘propaganda’, ‘clientele’). Additionally, the 
pro-consensus is highlighted by a call for consent (‘agreement’, ‘solidarity’, ‘responsibility’) 
mainly from governing parties when addressing the opposition parties in parliament, and the 
coding also defines positive and negative attitudes towards the international and European 
political factors (‘IMF’, ‘Troika’, ‘EU’). Finally, as mentioned above the data are examined in 
terms of party leader and party representative speeches during the three memoranda 
parliamentary debates— a total of 43 individual texts. Collectively, the seven categories 
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comprised some 107 inputs in the HAMLET II vocabulary. The texts are examined as a whole. 
In order to avoid coder ‘bias’, reliability checks were carried out to ensure that choice of 
pledge and coding were as accurate as possible. Additionally, in semi-automated software like 
HAMLET II the application of coding categories is carried out automatically so there is no 
reliability issue in this regard (Bara, Weale and Bicquelet 2007, p. 580).  
 
People:  us/we ‘εμείς’, nation ‘λαός’, country ‘χώρα’, national ‘εθνικός’, motherland 
‘πατρίδα’, society ‘κοινωνία’, citizens ‘πολίτες’ 
Pro-consensual: co-operation ‘συνεργασία’, prosperity ‘ευημερία’, effort ‘προσπάθεια’, 
agreement ‘συμφωνία’, solidarity ‘αλληλεγγύη’ 
Anti-establishment: corruption ‘διαφθορά’, interdependence ‘διαπλοκή’, bribery 
‘δωροδοκία’, clientelism ‘πελατειακές σχέσεις’, party politics ‘κομματοκρατία’, rulers 
‘ρουσφέτι’, traitors ‘προδότες’, capital ‘κεφάλαιο’, sovereignty ‘κυριαρχία’, patronage 
‘πατρονάρισμα’ 
Pro-EU/Interantional: Europe ‘Ευρώπη’, allies ‘σύμμαχοι’ 
Anti-EU/International: IMF ‘ΔΝΤ’, Troika ‘Τρόικα’, enemies ‘εχθροί’, imperialists 
‘ιμπεριαλιστές’ 
Pro-memorandum: need ‘ανάγκη’, responsibility ‘ευθύνη’, future ‘μέλλον’, success 
‘επιτυχία’ 
Anti-memorandum: unpleasant ‘δυσάρεστο’, tragedy ‘τραγωδία’, disaster ‘καταστροφή’, 
sell-off ‘ξεπούλημα’ 
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Appendix 3  
Figure 2: Salience of parliamentary discourse by party and leader (2010)
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Figure 3: Salience of parliamentary discourse by party and leader 2012
T
h
e
 p
e
o
p
le
P
ro
-M
e
m
o
ra
n
tu
m
A
n
ti
-M
e
m
o
ra
n
d
u
m
P
ro
-C
o
n
c
e
n
s
u
a
l
A
n
t i
-E
s
ta
b
li
s
h
m
e
n
t
P
ro
-E
U
/I
n
te
rn
a
t i
o
n
a
l
A
n
t i
-E
U
/I
n
te
rn
a
t i
o
n
a
l
0
5
1 0
1 5
S a lie n c e  o f p a r lia m e n ta ry  d is c o u rs e
 b y  p a rty  (2 01 2 )
C a t e g o r ie s
S
a
li
e
n
c
e
 %
S y r iz a  2 0 1 2
P A S O K  2 0 1 2
N D  2012
L A O S  2 0 1 2
K K E  20 12
T
h
e
 p
e
o
p
le
P
ro
-M
e
m
o
ra
n
tu
m
A
n
ti
-M
e
m
o
ra
n
d
u
m
P
ro
-C
o
n
c
e
n
s
u
a
l
A
n
t i
-E
s
ta
b
li
s
h
m
e
n
t
P
ro
-E
U
/I
n
te
rn
a
t i
o
n
a
l
A
n
t i
-E
U
/I
n
te
rn
a
t i
o
n
a
l
0
5
1 0
1 5
S a lie n c e  o f p a r lia m e n ta ry  d is c o u rs e
 b y  le a d e r (2 0 1 2 )
C a t e g o r ie s
S
a
li
e
n
c
e
 %
T s ip ra s /S y r iz a  2 0 1 2
P a p a n d re o u /P A S O K  2 0 1 2
S a m a ra s /N D  2 0 1 2
K a ra tz a fe r is /L A O S  2 0 1 2
P a p arig a /K K E  2 0 12
Figure 4: Salience of parliamentary discourse by party and leader 2015
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Figure 5: Salience of parliamentary discourse by year  
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